

# Network Traffic Monitoring & Security

*from academic project to commercial product*



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and security workshop, 24.4.2014

- INVEA-TECH Introduction
  - from academic project to commercial company
- FlowMon Solution Introduction
- Typical Use Cases from Corporate Environments
- FlowMon for R&D purposes

- Czech university spin-off company
- Established in 2007
- 40+ employees, \$ 3M revenue
- Key focus
  - **Flow Monitoring and Network Behavior Analysis**
  - **Hardware acceleration and FPGA Solutions**
- Products deployed at 500+ customers worldwide



- CESNET started activities with programmable hardware in 2002 - project Liberouter
- Cooperation with Masaryk University and Brno University of Technology
- Targets:
  - acceleration of high-speed network application (IPv6 router)
  - usage of programmable hardware
  - development of hardware accelerators COMBO based on FPGA technology for acceleration of critical tasks in data processing
- Participation on EU project 6NET (IST-2001-32063)
- Continuous growth and formation of strong R&D team in area of programmable hardware and high-speed network application



- Successful end of 6NET project
- Cooperation on next EU projects
- SCAMPI (IST-2001-32404)
  - 2002 – 2005, network monitoring of 10Gbps lines
  - joining to project in 2003 instead of commercial partners
  - functional prototype developed, successful review
  - recommendation – commercialize outputs in practice
- GEÁNT2 (contract No. 511082)
  - cooperation of 26 NRENs from 34 countries
  - activity JRA2 – focus on network security
  - functional prototype of HW accelerated NetFlow probe - FlowMon
  - final recommendation – monitor network by the NetFlow probe
  - GEÁNT2 Security Toolset – FlowMon Probes & NfSen collector



- June 2007 – INVEA-TECH was established
- Technology transfer from CESNET to INVEA-TECH
  - hard to find right model
  - first technology transfer from CESNET



- INVEA-TECH
  - long way from prototype to product
  - close cooperation with academic area (CESNET, Czech and abroad universities, EU projects)


- 
- A high-speed network interface card (NIC) with a green PCB, black heat sinks, and a BNC connector. The card features a large black heat sink on the right side and two smaller ones on the left. A BNC connector is visible on the front panel. The card is mounted on a green PCB with various electronic components.




- Network Traffic Monitoring and Security solution
- **DETAILED NETWORK TRAFFIC VISIBILITY**
  - Do you know what's really happening in your network – not only to Internet but also in LAN and WAN? Real-time and historically?
  - Are you paying too much for Internet or WAN connection?
  - Is your network slow?
- **ANOMALY DETECTION** (based on Network Behavior Analysis - NBA)
  - Do you easily detect DOS/DDOS, and attacks against services?
  - What about APTs, zero-day attacks and polymorphic malware?
  - Are you able to reveal viruses/malware not detected by antivirus?







- FlowMon Probes
  - source of network statistics (NetFlow, IPFIX)
- FlowMon Collectors
  - visualization and evaluation of network statistics
- FlowMon ADS
  - detection of attacks, anomalies and undesirable behavior





- High-performance standalone probe - source of IP flow records in NetFlow v5,9 and IPFIX format
- 1U rack appliance / VMware appliance
- Leadership in performance
  - wire-speed models
- Up to 6x 1G, 8x 10G, 2x 40G, 1x 100G monitoring interfaces
- 10MbE to 100GbE, IPv4/IPv6, MPLS, VLAN, GRE ...
- Application detection (NBAR2), VoIP (SIP/RTP), URLs, network performance monitoring (ART, SRT, Delay)...



- Appliance for flow data storage & analysis
  - 1U/2U/VMware appliance
- NetFlow v5/v9, IPFIX, sFlow, Netstream... support
- Based on nfdump/NfSen, but completely redesigned and you wouldn't recognize it
- Tuned & optimized to be suitable for the largest networks (>200k fps)




- More user friendly, automation, optimizations
- Automatic flow data source detections
- User defined dashboard
- Improved Top N statistics
- Enhanced alerting
- Intelligent reporting - online/email, PDF/CSV
- IPFIX support, extended about lot of fields
- Fast & easy configuration
- .....




- **System for automatic network traffic analysis**

- Detection of security & operational incidents and suspicious behavior





- **Undesirable patterns in communications**

- Internal and external attacks
  - Undesirable services & applications
  - Operational & configuration problems












- **Behavior Analysis**


- Behavior profiles
  - Anomalies detection



- Detection of undesirable patterns in communication
  - Attacks (port scanning, dictionary attacks, denial of service, telnet protocol)
  - Data traffic anomalies (DNS, multicast, non-standard communications)
  - Device behavior anomalies (changes in long-term device behavior profile)
  - Undesirable applications (P2P networks, instant messenger, anonymizer)
  - Internal security problems (viruses, spyware, botnets)
  - Mail traffic (outgoing spam)
  - Operational problem (delays, high traffic, reverse DNS records)

#	Source	Event type	Detail	Timestamp	Net flow source	Targets
1	 192.168.3.107	LATENCY	Maximal latency: 930 ms (protocol: TCP, source port: 80, destination port: 50844).	2013-01-22 08:45:43	demo.invea.cz	 192.168.3.148
2	 192.168.3.132	LATENCY	Maximal latency: 706 ms (protocol: TCP, source port: 49885, destination port: 2869).	2013-01-22 08:45:37	demo.invea.cz	 192.168.3.133
3	 192.168.3.129	DNSANOMALY	Attempt to use of unauthorized DNS server (connections: 3).	2013-01-22 08:45:19	demo.invea.cz	 192.168.3.254
4	 192.168.3.129	DNSQUERY	848 DNS queries (packets) in 15 minutes, 254.09 average of the network.	2013-01-22 08:45:19	demo.invea.cz	 192.168.3.254,  192.168.3.254

- Behavior analysis
  - Behavior profile (client/server, data traffic, partners, traffic structure)
  - Anomaly detection (actual behavior against long-term profile)
  - Statistics information (continues indicators about network behavior)


































































































# Use Cases




Typical real use cases from our customers

# DDoS from Spoofed IPs

- Finance institutions
- Several workstations infected by botnet
- Spoofed China IPs attack to Vietnam


#	Zdrojová IP	Typ události	Detail	Čas	Zdroj NetFlow dat	Cíle
1	 112.90.18.105	L3ANOMALY	The traffic not belonging to any internal network was detected (this may indicate spoofing). Transferred: 2.66 MiB, packets: 65 559.	2013-08-24 07:15:21	localhost	 1.52.6.170,  1.52.13.199,  1.52.42.167,  1.52.59.228,  1.52.71.217,  1.52.87.249,  1.52.133.228,  1.52.174.61,  1.52.192.113,  1.52.218.16, ...
2	 112.91.30.17	L3ANOMALY	The traffic not belonging to any internal network was detected (this may indicate spoofing). Transferred: 2.37 MiB, packets: 58 379.	2013-08-24 07:15:21	localhost	 1.52.54.212,  1.52.109.106,  1.52.167.73,  1.52.184.215,  1.52.191.229,  1.52.218.123,  1.52.220.241,  1.52.238.4,  1.52.241.199,  1.53.8.41, ...
3	 121.10.112.17	L3ANOMALY	The traffic not belonging to any internal network was detected (this may indicate spoofing). Transferred: 2.37 MiB, packets: 58 266.	2013-08-24 07:15:21	localhost	 1.52.1.176,  1.52.2.100,  1.52.7.105,  1.52.44.162,  1.52.77.224,  1.52.128.196,  1.52.128.214,  1.52.144.204,  1.52.199.183,  1.52.241.170, ...
4	 183.61.138.105	L3ANOMALY	The traffic not belonging to any internal network was detected (this may indicate spoofing). Transferred: 2.66 MiB, packets: 65 415.	2013-08-24 07:15:21	localhost	 1.52.58.25,  1.52.85.224,  1.52.86.18,  1.52.92.157,  1.52.174.104,  1.52.183.10,  1.52.184.230,  1.52.190.102,  1.52.203.16,  1.52.235.13, ...
5	 210.73.221.181	L3ANOMALY	The traffic not belonging to any internal network was detected (this may indicate spoofing). Transferred: 2.36 MiB, packets: 58 086.	2013-08-24 07:15:21	localhost	 1.52.28.245,  1.52.44.63,  1.52.112.109,  1.52.143.60,  1.52.177.97,  1.53.40.147,  1.53.58.10,  1.53.89.183,  1.53.122.157,  1.53.221.26, ...
6	 112.90.18.105	L3ANOMALY	The traffic not belonging to any internal network was detected (this may indicate spoofing). Transferred: 2.66 MiB, packets: 65 559.	2013-08-24 05:39:59	localhost	 1.52.4.138,  1.52.12.103,  1.52.28.61,  1.52.31.70,  1.52.37.82,  1.52.42.130,  1.52.44.24,  1.52.48.142,  1.52.67.39,  1.52.83.34, ...
7	 112.91.30.17	L3ANOMALY	The traffic not belonging to any internal network was detected (this may indicate spoofing). Transferred: 2.37 MiB, packets: 58 379.	2013-08-24 03:38:31	localhost	 1.52.7.220,  1.52.11.109,  1.52.28.57,  1.52.42.90,  1.52.74.20,  1.52.95.134,  1.52.114.14,  1.52.115.205,  1.52.119.156,  1.52.122.10, ...
8	 121.10.112.17	L3ANOMALY	The traffic not belonging to any internal network was detected (this may indicate spoofing). Transferred: 2.37 MiB, packets: 58 266.	2013-08-24 03:00:34	localhost	 1.52.12.16,  1.52.77.184,  1.52.104.14,  1.52.125.205,  1.52.128.99,  1.52.134.215,  1.52.137.109,  1.52.139.229,  1.52.203.143,  1.52.209.197, ...
9	 183.61.138.105	L3ANOMALY	The traffic not belonging to any internal network was detected (this may indicate spoofing). Transferred: 2.66 MiB, packets: 65 415.	2013-08-24 03:00:34	localhost	 1.52.37.201,  1.52.44.55,  1.52.87.138,  1.52.122.97, ...



# Authentication Attack

- Healthcare
- Attacker IP somewhere from Indonesia
- Attacks against phpMyAdmin web application
- Exposed to public Internet but not necessary

## Event details

Type: **Web form attack (HTTPDICT)** Event source:  **202.61.105.246** Probability: **100 %**  
Timestamp: **2014-03-07 21:10:00** Event source host name: **N/A** False positive: **No**  
First NetFlow: **2014-03-07 21:09:24** NetFlow source: **CORE**

Detail: **The server (target) has sent the 1.65 KiB file 591 times.**


on IP	Start	Duration	Protocol	Src. port	Dst. port	Trns. B	Packets	Flags	Tos	Src. MAC	Dst. MAC	Src. VLAN	Dst. VLAN	Nbar tag	URL
105.246	2014-03-07 21:09:24.733	0.495	TCP	80	23040	1693	5	.AP.SF	0	a4:ba:db:e0:7e:72	02:17:c5:e0:45:88	0	0	3:80	
155.11	2014-03-07 21:09:24.733	0.495	TCP	23040	80	328	6	.AP.SF	0	02:17:c5:e0:45:88	a4:ba:db:e0:7e:72	0	0	3:80	 .224.15 /phpMyAdmin-2.6.0-rc1/main.php
155.11	2014-03-07 21:09:25.228	0.496	TCP	23050	80	276	5	.AP.SF	0	02:17:c5:e0:45:88	a4:ba:db:e0:7e:72	0	0	3:80	 .224.15 /phpMyAdmin-2.6.0-rc2/main.php
105.246	2014-03-07 21:09:25.228	0.495	TCP	80	23050	1693	5	.AP.SF	0	a4:ba:db:e0:7e:72	02:17:c5:e0:45:88	0	0	3:80	

- Manufacturing
- TOR (Onion router) client on laptop
- Use is bypassing security measures
  - To access resources blocked by company policy



#	Source	Event type	Detail	Timestamp	Net flow source	Targets
1	10.0.1.25	TOR	Tor communication, unique onion routers: 51	2012-05-09 13:06:59	localhost	31.31.74.162, 38.229.70.61, 46.165.196.73, 46.166.147.126, 50.7.240.10, 50.115.125.54, 62.75.186.116, 62.220.136.253, 70.33.208.83, 74.125.232.246, , ...

- Information technology
- Change of DNS server that is being used
- Attacker can manipulate with DNS records and redirect the user to malicious or phishing sites



- Retail
- Employee leaving the company
- Internal documents were stored on public data share service hosted by Yahoo
- Detected as data upload from LAN to the Internet
- Inspected and evaluated as serious issue

#	Source	Event type	Detail	Timestamp	Net flow source	Targets
1	10.1.1.84	UPLOAD	Uploaded: 38.83 MiB, downloaded: 0.57 MiB, ports: 80	2012-05-10 11:43:34	localhost	98.136.145.156 (r5.ycpi.vip.ac4.yahoo.net)
2	10.1.1.84	UPLOAD	Uploaded: 243.48 MiB, downloaded: 4.07 MiB, ports: 80	2012-05-10 11:37:19	localhost	98.136.145.156 (r5.ycpi.vip.ac4.yahoo.net)
3	10.1.1.84	UPLOAD	Uploaded: 199.97 MiB, downloaded: 4.49 MiB, ports: 80	2012-05-10 11:33:47	localhost	98.136.145.156 (r5.ycpi.vip.ac4.yahoo.net)
4	10.1.1.84	UPLOAD	Uploaded: 232.03 MiB, downloaded: 4.38 MiB, ports: 80	2012-05-10 11:28:32	localhost	98.136.145.156 (r5.ycpi.vip.ac4.yahoo.net)
5	10.1.1.84	UPLOAD	Uploaded: 197.11 MiB, downloaded: 3.74 MiB, ports: 80	2012-05-10 11:24:10	localhost	98.136.145.156 (r5.ycpi.vip.ac4.yahoo.net)



# Sniffing of Network Traffic

- Services
- Malware use DHCP spoofing to introduce itself as gateway and to sniff the traffic

192.168.0.53 As source: 0 As target: 8

DNSANOMALY 0 8

#

1 Use of unexpected

2 Use of unexpected

3 Use of unexpected

4 Filter

5 src ip 192

6

7

8

AND <None>

C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe

Adaptér sítě Ethernet Bezdrátové připojení k síti:

Stav média . . . . . : odpojeno

Adaptér sítě Ethernet Připojení k místní síti:

Přípona DNS podle připojení . . . . . :

Adresa IP . . . . . : 192.168.0.47

Maska podsítě . . . . . : 255.255.255.0

Účchozí brána . . . . . : 192.168.0.53

Source Source

192.168.0.14

192.168.0.23

192.168.0.22

.168.0.24

.168.0.35

.168.0.20

.168.0.49

.168.0.27

Process Export to CSV

Start Time - first seen	Duration	Protocol	Source IP address	Source Port	Destination IP address	Destination Port	TCP Flags	TOS	Packets	Bytes	Packets per second	Bits per second	Bytes per package	Flows
2013-05-28 09:13:39.982	144.353	UDP	192.168.0.53	bootps	255.255.255.255	bootpc	...	0	28	9330	0	517	333	1
2013-05-28 09:16:36.213	55.402	UDP	192.168.0.53	bootps	255.255.255.255	bootpc	.....	0	16	5340	0	771	333	1

Flows 2 Bytes 14.33 KB Packets 44




FlowMon Community program



- Target
  - Enable users to make program changes to FlowMon solution
  - Don't provide closed NetFlow based solution, but rather provide possibilities to use it for further R&D in area of traffic monitoring, customize according to needs
- Open to any applicant
  - Just ask for joining and get update package to FlowMon appliance (open the API)
- Main benefits
  - Join to community around FlowMon solution
  - Access to all plugins developed in the Community program
  - Knowledge base, share experience, discussions...

- Customization of FlowMon Probe
  - FlowMon exporter provide API for users plugins which can directly influence process of monitoring, generation and export of flow data
    - packets parsing, processing and storing to internal structures
    - computations over the flow data
    - data storing and export to collector



- Customization of FlowMon Collector
  - realized through plugins to NfSen application
  - usage of NfSen API

- **University of Twente**

- SURFmap plugin  
(<http://sourceforge.net/p/surfmap/home/Home/>)
- Collector plugin
- Adds a geographical dimension to network traffic
- Based on the Google Maps API



- **University of Twente for SURFnet**
  - Monitoring Ethernet Networks Using IPFIX
  - Probe plugin
  - Probes monitor traffic at Ethernet-layer and use a modified process of flow creation
    - key-fields - SRC and DST MAC, VLAN ID and Ethernet type
  - Provide an overview of all traffic protocols operating on top of Ethernet (ARP, LLDP, STP, Novell IPX, ...)

Start time - first seen	End time - last seen	src MAC address	dst MAC address	TYPE	VLAN	EHL	EPL	IN	CVLAN	CP	P	Packets	Bytes
2010-12-12 12:21:34.584	2010-12-12 12:24:52.785	00:0E:20:61:C8:C0	01:00:5F:FA:DF:E7	0x0800	0	14	1356	7	0	0	0	1132	1550840
2010-12-12 12:21:37.398	2010-12-12 12:25:21.079	00:1E:4D:1A:BF:CE	01:00:5F:FB:DE:E4	0x0800	0	14	1356	7	0	0	0	58	79460
2010-12-12 12:21:38.232	2010-12-12 12:25:18.888	00:1E:4D:1A:BF:CE	01:00:5F:FB:DE:BC	0x0800	0	14	1356	7	0	0	0	64	87680
2010-12-12 12:21:47.047	2010-12-12 12:24:38.847	00:23:DF:BA:10:8B	01:00:5F:F7:F8:0D	0x0800	0	14	54	7	0	0	0	3	188
2010-12-12 12:21:49.931	2010-12-12 12:25:10.067	00:1E:4D:1A:BF:CE	01:00:5F:F5:80:FE	0x0800	0	14	208	7	0	0	0	5	1299
2010-12-12 12:22:31.976	2010-12-12 12:24:47.107	00:1E:4D:1A:BF:CE	01:00:5F:CB:57:57	0x0800	0	14	46	7	0	0	0	2	120
2010-12-12 12:22:31.976	2010-12-12 12:24:47.107	00:0E:20:61:C8:C0	01:00:5F:CB:57:57	0x0800	0	14	46	7	0	0	0	4	240

...

EHL	... ethernetHeaderLength	CVLAN	... dot1qCustomerVlanId	P	... dot1qPriority
EPL	... ethernetPayloadLength	CP	... dot1qCustomerPriority		

- FlowMon solution provides data flow monitoring
  - Network operational monitoring
  - Network security monitoring
- Suitable even for the largest networks
- Can be used for further R&D in area of flow monitoring and security



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